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Standing To Enforce Trusts: Renewing and
Expanding Professor Gaubatz's 1984
Discussion of Settlor Enforcement
EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR.*
Almost a quarter of a century ago John Gaubatz wrote about "gran-
tor" standing in "one private law setting" (trust law),1 ending the intro-
ductory paragraphs by observing that a comprehensive treatment of
"standing in the private law setting ... must wait for another time, and
perhaps another author."2 I write, at the risk of being presumptuous, to
accept my friend's invitation-at least as it relates to our shared field of
trust law. As a relevant aside, I mention that John served as one of the
advisers for The American Law Institute's ongoing project to produce a
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts, the fourth (and final) volume
of which is being developed and will include a lengthy section stating
rules of standing. (As the reporter, I was pleased to receive a supportive
telephone response from John in the spring of 2007 regarding my plans
for the preliminary draft of that section on standing.) The analyses of
settlor standing in his 1984 article, and the broader insights they offer on
standing in general, have been influential not only in my work but also
in a recent, unprecedented period of scholarly discussion and legislative
activity, as well as in reported cases, on matters of standing to prevent or
remedy breaches of trust.3
* Walter Perry Johnson Professor Emeritus, School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley.
1. John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting,
62 N.C. L. REV. 905 (1984).
2. Id. at 907.
3. Perhaps most significant of the recent activity is the Uniform Trust Code, notably
broadening settlor standing in several sections. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended
2005), 7C U.L.A. 486 (2006); id. § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 495-96; id. § 706(a), 7C U.L.A. 575. Also
of special importance is the ongoing American Law Institute project, Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). The project reporter, Evelyn Brody,
discusses the 1984 article in one of her recent works. See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to
the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1204-06
& n.54 (2007); see also, e.g., Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing To Enforce Charitable Transfers
Under Section 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important Is It and How
Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611, 629-30 & n.88 (2003); Charles E.
Rounds, Jr., Social Investing, IOLTA and the Law of Trusts: The Settlor's Case Against the
Political Use of Charitable and Client Funds, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 163, 167, 186 & n.105 (1990).
Citations to Professor Gaubatz's article continue to appear in treatises. See, e.g., RONALD
CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 413, at 45 n.2 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES]; WALTER
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The inquiry in this essay goes beyond the 1984 article and essen-
tially asks: Who, aside from trust beneficiaries, and attorneys general in
charitable trust matters, has standing to maintain a suit against a trustee
to prevent or remedy a breach of trust or otherwise to enforce the trust?
The initial paragraph of the article noted the "paucity of literature dis-
cussing when and how the grantor can enforce ... a trust,"4 and a subse-
quent introductory paragraph added: "Enough of these situations [of
settlor enforcement] exist to prove false the overstatement, common in
the treatises, that a grantor who is not a beneficiary lacks standing to
enforce a trust. An analysis of the differences between successful gran-
tor enforcement actions and those in which the grantor was denied
standing, however, has been lacking."5 The article went on to express
concern over, inter alia, the "Inadequacy of Beneficiary Analysis"
(largely in the definition of "beneficiaries") 6 and the "inadequacy" of
efforts at the time to define the "fiduciaries" or "representatives" who
may act on behalf of one or more beneficiaries or instead of attorneys
general.7 As we shall see, developments in the years since the 1984
article's publication offer greater clarity in these matters, at least in
many states as well as in principle; also, some significant trends are
currently discernible in the rules of standing not only for settlors but also
for others.
The discussion in this essay examines questions of standing in the
trust context, including standing to intervene in, as well as standing to
initiate and maintain, enforcement proceedings (as comprehensively
defined for these purposes). In the course of the discussion, attention is
given at appropriate points to the rationale underlying restrictions on
standing in trust-enforcement cases, and to the advantages and disadvan-
tages of granting standing for various purposes to various categories of
L. NOSSAMAN & JOSEPH L. WYATT, JR., TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION §§ 1.05, 34.13
(2007); 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTr AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 24.4.1 (5th ed.
2007). And discussion of the 1984 article appears in cases. See, e.g., Morse v. Bank One, No. 03-
2638, 2005 WL 3541037, at *8 (E.D. La. Nov. 1, 2005), Sanders v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of
Leesburg, 585 So. 2d 1064, 1066 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
4. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 905.
5. Id. at 906-07 (footnote omitted).
6. Id. at 908-09.
7. Id. at 909-26.
8. "Enforcement" often refers to efforts not only to enjoin or redress a breach of trust but
also to petitions for instruction, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 71 (2003), for removal of
a trustee, id. § 37, for equitable deviation, id. § 66, for cy pres, id. § 67, and to divide or combine
trusts, id. § 68. On the other hand, the term does not refer (and the rules limiting standing in this
essay do not apply) to proceedings seeking to set aside or reform a trust brought by settlors or
their successors in interest for fraud, undue influence, and the like, id. § 62, as these are not
proceedings to enforce a trust; nor are proceedings brought by a person to protect an individual
interest in a parcel of land or other specific asset in which both the person and a trust hold
undivided (or successive) interests.
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potential litigants. Because these potentially relevant considerations are
most apparent and best introduced in the charitable-trust context, rules
of standing are discussed first in that setting, then in the context of pri-
vate trusts, and finally in regard to trusts that have both charitable and
private purposes.
I. CHARITABLE TRUSTS
The authority and "primary" responsibility for the enforcement of
charitable trusts reside in the attorney general or other appropriate public
official of the jurisdiction involved.9 Similarly well established, how-
ever, is the standing of a trustee or successor trustee to maintain a suit
against a co-trustee or predecessor trustee to prevent or remedy a breach
of trust.' ° In addition, modern cases and statutes generally recognize
that, despite some difficulties of definition, persons having a "special
interest" in a trust have standing to enforce that trust."
A. Attorneys General and Trustees
Charitable trusts ordinarily do not have the definite beneficiaries
that are required for the validity of private trusts.' 2 The community
interest in the enforcement of charitable trusts is represented in most
states by the attorney general, or in a few by some other designated
public officer, such as the local district or county attorney.' 3 (For sim-
plicity, such officials are hereafter included in references to the "attor-
ney general.") Although not exclusive,' 4 the attorney general's standing
to enforce charitable trusts is "primary" in the sense that the attorney
general must normally be joined as a party even in an enforcement suit
9. This jurisdiction is generally said, perhaps overly simplistically, to be the jurisdiction "in
which the charitable trust is to be administered." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt.
a (1959).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 17-21.
11. See infra Part.l.B.
12. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003), and especially cmt. c, with id.
§§ 44-46, and id. § 47.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
14. Despite continued (unsuccessful) arguments by litigants and some careless language in
opinions and trust literature, it is and long has been clear that an attorney general's enforcement
standing is not exclusive. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. For an oft-quoted
discussion by Judge Traynor, see Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d
932, 934-35 (Cal. 1964), pointing out that
the Attorney General does not have exclusive power to enforce a charitable trust and
that a trustee or other person having a sufficient special interest may also bring an
action for this purpose.... Nothing in [the California Corporations Code] suggests
that trustees are precluded from bringing an action to enforce the trust. The
Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act similarly authorizes
the Attorney General to supervise charitable trusts, and likewise fails to preclude
suits by trustees.
2008]
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brought by a trustee or other person having standing to do so. 5 Further-
more, where suit may be brought on behalf of an attorney general on the
relation of a third person (usually called a "relator"), the attorney general
may refuse to allow the suit or may, if the suit proceeds, control the
conduct of the suit, or even terminate it.1
6
If a charitable trust has multiple trustees, a suit to enforce the trust
can be maintained by one or more of the co-trustees against one or more
of the other co-trustees, 7 based on the duty of even an innocent trustee
to act reasonably to prevent or remedy a breach of trust by a co-trustee.18
Similarly, if a trustee has committed a breach of trust and thereafter is
removed or otherwise ceases to serve as trustee, a successor trustee has
standing to sue that former trustee (or third parties) to redress the breach
of trust.19 (Given that petitions for instruction, equitable deviation, mod-
ification cy pres, and the like, are forms of "enforcement" proceedings,20
it is appropriate to view any trustee as having standing for such pur-
poses.21) Trustee standing, unlike the role of relator (above), does not
depend on authorization of, and is not subject to control by, the attorney
general.
If a sole trustee who has committed a breach of trust is not pre-
cluded from continuing to serve as trustee,22 suit for redress may be
brought by the attorney general or by a person having special-interest
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. a (1959).
16. Id.
17. Id. cmt. b. Comment g notes that, as in this essay as well, "the power of visitors of a
charitable corporation is not within the scope of.. . this Subject." See also BOGERT'S TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES, supra note 3, § 413, at 45 ("[S]tandard trust doctrine allows trustees or successor
trustees to sue cotrustees or [prior] trustees of the same trust. As specifically pertaining to
charitable trusts, ... [at least] one court has permitted a charitable corporation's board of directors
to bring suit against the corporation's board of trustees. . . . [And] even where the Attorney
General did not grant relator status to minority trustees for an action to enjoin, a court has held
that such minority had power to bring the action.") (footnotes omitted). Also, on fiduciary-interest
standing, see MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 334 (2004).
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 (2003).
19. Cf Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200 cmt. f (1959); see, e.g., CHARLES E. ROUNDS,
JR., LORING: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK § 7.1 (2007 ed.). This standing is supported by the normal
duty as stated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 cmt. d (2003), to take "reasonable steps
to uncover and redress [a breach] by a predecessor fiduciary."
20. See supra note 8.
21. See, e.g., In re Estate of Russell, 866 N.E.2d 604, 605 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (co-trustees
petitioning and counter-petitioning for one another's removal); see also In re Riddell, 157 P.3d
888 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (involving a trustee's successful petition for a modification under the
modernized rule of equitable deviation as stated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003)
(on which compare UNiF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006)).
22. Ordinarily a breach of trust is not a sufficient ground for removal in the absence of
flagrant or repeated misconduct by the trustee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. e
(2003).
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standing.23
B. Standing Based on "Special Interest"
A charitable trust may not be enforced by a person who, merely as
a member of the public, may be said to benefit from the performance of
the trust. That degree of community or public interest is to be repre-
sented by the attorney general and therefore, without more, is insuffi-
cient to support another's claim to standing.24 Even the fact that a
person is a potential recipient of benefits under a charitable trust is not,
alone, sufficient to entitle the person to maintain a suit to enforce the
trust.25 On the other hand, modern authority, supported by leading trea-
tises and by a large and growing body of cases and statutes2 6 recognizes
that a person who has a "special interest" in the performance of a chari-
table trust has standing to sue the trustee to prevent or remedy a breach
of trust, or otherwise to enforce the trust.
Widespread recognition of the special-interest concept, however,
has not necessarily led to ease of application-or even to consistency
from place to place and perhaps from time to time.27
This is particularly true, and understandable, in the more challeng-
ing types of situations in which there is a need for case-by-case balanc-
ing of policy concerns and objectives. In these situations, the
requirement that there be a finding of "special interest" provides a fun-
damentally important safeguard for trustees and charitable resources by
limiting the risk, and frequency, of potentially costly, unwarranted litiga-
23. See infra Part I.B. Also, although not universally accepted, the better view is that a court
may act on its own motion if it becomes aware of a possible breach of trust by a trustee. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. h (1959); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(a)
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 575 (2006). A court so acting may find it appropriate to appoint a
special or temporary trustee, perhaps best designated for this purpose as a "trustee ad litem." See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(l), reporter's note (2003).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 & cmts. b, c (1959).
25. Id.
26. See generally UNiF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 486 cmt (2006);
BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 3, § 414.
27. In addition to cases cited throughout Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990),
which is discussed at length in text infra notes 36-45, and in BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,
supra note 3, § 414, see, for example, among the few cases that have rejected the concept, Weaver
v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918 (Mass. 1997), and Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007) (discussed
infra note 48, basing its decision on a strained interpretation of recent legislation), while some
cases, like State ex rel. Nixon v. Hutcherson, 96 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. 2003), appear still to require a
"present" claim to benefits. Among cases at the more expansive end of the spectrum are those
cited infra note 49. See generally Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing To Sue in the Charitable
Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 37, 61-78 (1993) (reviewing then existing cases to assess likelihood that
a court will find a special interest for standing purposes). A later (not particularly surprising) case
denying standing to an association (comprised primarily of alumni) for lack of "special interest" is
In re Milton Hershey School, 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006).
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tion. In appropriate circumstances, however, a recognition of special-
interest standing reflects society's interest not only in enhancing the
enforcement of charitable trusts but also in honoring the reasonable
expectations of settlors and the donor public. It is important in the bal-
ancing of these considerations to take account of the inherent limitations
of attorney-general enforcement, essentially, limitations of resources,
information, and the constraints of other responsibilities, as well as con-
flicting duties and real-world influences. 21 Special-interest standing,
properly understood, is neither dependent on the approval nor subject to
the control of the attorney general.2 9
The concept of "special interest" should not be, and increasingly is
not,30 limited to rights or potential rights to receive benefits under a
charitable trust. The nature of a person's special interest, however, may
affect the extent of the person's standing (that is, the types of trustee
misconduct the person may bring suit to enjoin or redress, or the types of
trustee-initiated proceedings the person may intervene to oppose).
Special interest in charitable benefits. Many charitable trusts are
so designed that a particular charitable institution or purpose is entitled
to receive a benefit from the trust, or that one or more individuals are or
will become identifiable as individuals entitled to receive a payment
under the terms of the trust. Thus, in some circumstances an intended
recipient is readily identifiable and clearly has standing (with notice to
the attorney general) to enforce the trust. For example, the terms of a
charitable trust may direct that its income be distributed periodically to a
particular charitable corporation (school, hospital, church, or the like);
that corporation can maintain a suit against the trustee for enforcement
28. See, for example, criticism and reports of devastating consequences of inaction
throughout SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. RoT", BROKEN TRUST (2006) (on the notorious
Bishop Estate controversy), and of attorney-general action in Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off, 108
COLUM. L. REV. pt. D (forthcoming May 2008) ("The evidence is also strongly consistent with the
widely-held belief that supervision of charitable trusts by state attorneys general is deficient.
Indeed, in this case the attorney general's intervention was counterproductive.... [O]ur findings
imply agency costs arising from the Trust's charitable trust form on the order of $850 million.").
See also Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004); Jill R. Horwitz & Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Common
Law Power of the Legislature: Insurer Conversions and Charitable Funds, 83 MILBANK Q. 225
(2005).
29. Cf, e.g., Horwitz & Fremont-Smith, supra note 28, at 227, 237, 242 (criticizing the
"anomaly" of the New York Attorney General's "unprecedented" conduct in the course of the
proceedings in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., v. State, 777 N.Y.S.2d 444 (App. Div. 2004) for
opposing (unsuccessfully) the court's grant of standing to others whose participation appeared
obviously important as a matter of fairness, as well as appropriate based on their apparent special
interest).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 40-45, 65-66, 102-05.
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of the trust.3" Also, if a provision in the terms of the trust further
designates a particular charitable organization to receive benefits in the
event that particular circumstances should occur, that organization has
standing to enforce the trust in order to protect (or eventually, perhaps,
assert) its interest under that provision.32 Similarly, if the purpose of a
charitable trust is to pay the salary of the president of a particular college
or the pastor of a particular church, the president or pastor has special-
interest standing to enforce the trust, as does the college or church.33
More difficult questions of standing arise when a trust is created to
provide charitable benefits to the members or selected members of a
described class or group that is reasonably limited, yet "indefinite" in the
sense required to qualify the trust purpose as charitable rather than pri-
vate.3 4 To understand whether, to what extent, and why a court should
allow one or more members of such a described group to maintain a suit
to enforce the trust on behalf of the group members, the opinion in the
leading case of Hooker v. Edes Home35 is uniquely instructive.
This 1990 District of Columbia case involved a trust to establish
and maintain "a free Home for aged and indigent Widows, residing, or
to reside," in Georgetown, where the Edes Home was to be located.36
Because the home "has never achieved full capacity" of widows eligible
under admission criteria established by the board of trustees, the trustees
sought court approval (essentially, cy pres) to close the home and to
transfer its sale proceeds and other assets to a different home at a differ-
ent location, with "continuation of the [trust] functions . . . at that loca-
tion."37 Several members of the class of "eligible potential residents of
Edes" sought to intervene in the proceeding initiated by the trustees.38
In reversing the lower court's denial of standing, the appellate court
acknowledged "the traditional rule" that would deny standing and the
rule's "rationale" that was based on "the recurring burdens on the trust
res and trustee of vexatious litigation that would result from recognition
31. Compare the example in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c, para. 1 (1959).
See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 644 cmt. (2006) ("[Tlhose with
standing include the state attorney general, a charitable organization expressly designated to
receive distributions under the terms of the trust, and other persons with a special interest.")
(emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 413 cmt. b (1959); cf. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b. para. 2 (2003). It does not matter that the enjoyment of the
interest of a clearly identified organization (or other beneficiary) is postponed and uncertain. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 48 cmt. a (2003); Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 908.
33. Compare the first example in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c. (1959).
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmts. a, a(1) (2003).
35. 579 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990).
36. Id. at 609.
37. Id. at 610.
38. Id. at 608 n.1.
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of a cause of action by any and all of a large number of individuals who
might benefit" from the trust, but went on to recognize an "exception to
the general rule... where an individual seeking enforcement of the trust
has a 'special interest' in continued performance of the trust distinguish-
able from that of the public at large."' 39 Because "special interest" is a
term of "uncertain scope," the opinion explained that it applies most
readily to "situations where the trust was created to benefit identified
persons" while those "for whose benefit the Edes trust was created are
not identified with that degree of particularity, but instead categori-
cally," acknowledging that "[o]lder cases treat persons who fairly
represent a class of identifiable (but not identified) beneficiaries as mere
'possible' beneficiaries, denying them standing."40 The opinion, how-
ever, went on to point out that Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391,
comment c, provides that "where a charitable trust is created for the
members of a small class of persons, a member of the class can maintain
a suit on behalf of himself and the other members of the class,"41 adding
that this
may reflect what Professor Bogert identifies as a modem trend in
cases . . . 'permitting persons deemed to represent a class of actual or
prospective beneficiaries to bring suit to enforce the charitable trust.'
These [modem] decisions recognize that application of the strict
traditional rule denying standing to 'potential' beneficiaries of a char-
itable trust may be inimical to trust purposes in cases where a suit to
enforce the trust does not present the dangers the rule was intended to
guard against."
The court thereafter mentioned a case from another state that had
emphasized the importance of avoiding "a multiplicity of lawsuits chal-
lenging a trustee's discretionary day-to-day administration" of a trust;4 3
but, after rejecting the "current beneficiary" restriction proposed by the
trustees, the Edes decision went on to "adopt another limiting factor"
because "[e]ven when a class of potential beneficiaries is small and dis-
tinct enough.., to have an interest distinguishable from the public's, the
problem of . . . recurring vexatious litigation may exist" so that "we
think it necessary-in the case of potential beneficiaries-also to con-
sider the nature of the challenge to the trustees' acts in deciding whether
to apply the special interest exception," citing a New York Court of
Appeals opinion that had observed that the action before it would
involve "the complete elimination of the individual plaintiffs' status as
39. Id. at 612.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 613.
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 614 (citing Kania v. Chatham, 254 S.E.2d 528, 530 (N.C. 1979)).
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preferred beneficiaries" so that the "policy reasons for limiting standing"
did not apply.44 Edes also distinguished the danger of recurring litiga-
tion in challenges to "ordinary exercise of discretion" (in, for example,
selecting among potential recipients) from the situation before the court,
observing that a "suit by a representative of a class of potential benefi-
ciaries should aim to vindicate the interests of the entire class and should
be addressed to trustee action that impairs those interests, not the inter-
ests of a given individual. 45
Based on the unusually comprehensive and refined, and fundamen-
tally sound, reasoning of the foregoing case, one can identify illustrative
situations in which special-interest standing of this type should be
appropriate. For example, if a charitable trust is created to contribute to
the costs of medical care for "needy residents" of a particular town or
village, a reasonably qualified member of that community should be
able to maintain a suit against the trustee to prevent, or to compel restitu-
tion for, a diversion of trust funds to a different purpose without a judi-
cial grant of cy pres.4 6 In a special-interest case of this type, however, it
is reasonable for a court to determine that the special interest would not
support standing with respect to ongoing or day-to-day matters of trust
management.47 Similarly, if the terms of a trust direct that its income be
used each year to provide college scholarships to selected students from
a particular high school, based on a prescribed procedure and set of cri-
teria, one or more of the current students who might reasonably expect
to meet the criteria would have standing to compel the trustee to adhere
to a trust's designated purpose, as a matter of common concern to all
potential scholarship recipients. In addition, if, as has become common
in recent years, a conservation easement is granted to a governmental
entity or other nonprofit organization to be held upon charitable trust or
the equivalent (usually, for tax reasons, perpetually), owners of adjoin-
ing or perhaps nearby land, and in some circumstances others, such as
downstream land owners, who benefit more than the public generally
should be recognized as having special-interest standing to compel
adherence to the easement's charitable purpose.
48
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479
N.E.2d 752, 765 (N.Y. 1985)).
45. Id. at 615.
46. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUST § 391 cmt. c (1959) ("Thus, where a charitable
trust is created for the poor members of a particular church, any such member of the church can
maintain a suit against the trustees for the enforcement of the trust.").
47. Cf supra text accompanying notes 43-45; infra text accompanying note 68.
48. "Perpetual conservation easements encumbering land were not used on a widespread basis
until the mid-1980s and courts are only now beginning to hear cases involving their substantial
modification or termination." Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and
Beyond, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673, 676 (2007) (footnotes omitted). McLaughlin went on to observe
20081
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Some more liberal cases have been willing to allow special-interest
standing in other circumstances when there appears to be a need to con-
sider a serious breach-of-trust allegation, especially when the attorney
general is supporting the trustee's position or simply declines to bring
suit.49
Special-interest standing: noncharitable beneficiaries. Many trusts
today have both charitable and private purposes, such as "charitable
lead" or "charitable remainder" trusts. Issues of standing in these situa-
tions are addressed in Part 111. 0
that "the donation of a perpetual conservation easement to [or purchase by] a municipality or land
trust . . . creates a charitable trust relationship," as a result of which the trustee "should not be
permitted to terminate or modify the.., stated purpose without.., a cy pres proceeding." Id. at
677 (introducing her elaborate examination of case law, relevant restatements, and legislation,
including uniform acts). On the matter of standing, see Grabowski v. City of Bristol, 780 A.2d
953, 955 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (standing granted because, as owners of adjoining land, the
individuals had interests greater than the public generally in the restricted use of the trust
property). On standing in environmental controversies generally, compare Daniel A. Farber, A
Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REv. (forthcoming 2008). But in Hicks v. Dowd,
157 P.3d 914, 920-21 (Wyo. 2007), the court denied special-interest standing to plaintiffs seeking
to enforce what the court readily concluded was a charitable trust in their attempt to prevent
extinguishment of the conservation easement for the purpose of allowing coal bed methane
development; the decision was based on a tortured interpretation of 2006 legislation based on the
Uniform Trust Code, which clearly calls for a different result. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 486 cmt. (2006) (charitable purposes; enforcement) ("[The statute's]
grant of standing to the settlor does not negate the right of ... persons with special interests to
enforce [a charitable trust.]"); id. § 1001, 7C U.L.A. 644 cmt. (remedies for breach of trust)
("[T]hose with standing [to remedy a breach] include . . . a charitable organization expressly
designated to receive distributions under the terms of the trust, and other persons with a special
interest."); see also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Could Coalbed Methane Be the Death of Conservation
Easements?, Wyo. LAW., Oct. 2006, at 18 (published while Hicks was pending before the
Wyoming Supreme Court). In addition to special-interest authorities cited supra notes 24-48, see
authorities cited in note 49 infra.
49. See, e.g., Grabowski, 780 A.2d at 450 (the attorney general had declined to participate);
Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc'y v. City of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Haw. 1988) ("Where a
trustee of a public charitable trust is a governmental agency... [that] will not seek instructions of
the court as to its duties .... and where . . . the attorney general as parens patriae, has actively
joined in supporting the alleged breach of trust, the citizens of this State would be left without
protection, or a remedy, unless we hold, as we do, that members of the public, as beneficiaries of
the trust, have standing to bring the matter to the attention of the court. Were we to hold
otherwise, the City ... would be free to dispose... [of] the trust comprising Kapiolani Park...
without the citizens of the City and State having any recourse to the courts. Such a result is
contrary to all principles of equity and shocking to the conscience of the court."); Fitzgerald v.
Baxter State Park Auth., 385 A.2d 189, 195-96 (Me. 1978) (attorney general disabled, as ex
officio member of park authority; several citizen users had standing to prevent a breach of trust
that would have violated a trust requirement that the land be kept in its natural state); City of
Patterson v. Patterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966) (city and
two residents had "special interest" in preventing relocation of a hospital; the opinion noted the
general recognition in the state and elsewhere of "neglected" and "sporadic" supervision, and
stated that, while this continues, a "liberal rule as to the standing ... seems decidedly in the public
interest").
50. See infra Part III and accompanying notes 113-18.
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Other trusts may have remote, uncertain private beneficial interests,
although the trusts are otherwise entirely for charitable purposes. Most
common are the implied reversionary (that is, potential "resulting trust")
interests that result from the possibility that the trustee will need to
apply for cy pres at some future time, with the second step in the cy pres
process under traditional doctrine requiring the court to determine
whether the settlor had a "general charitable intent"; if not, the trust
property would revert to the settlor (or successors in interest). 5 Mod-
ernized default rules in many states now eliminate that second step (and
thus the private reversionary interest) absent some contrary provision
expressed in the trust instrument.52 The other type of noncharitable-ben-
eficiary situation might result, for example, from an express gift over on
particular circumstances, such as failure of the charitable trust.53
Despite apparent assumptions of some to the contrary, it seems clear that
the potential takers by reversion or gift over are entitled, as a matter of
due process, to notice and participation in cy pres or other proceedings
that might adversely affect their interests.54 This should suggest that
special-interest standing is appropriate to protect (or assert) the nonchar-
itable future interests in such trusts, but implied reversions clearly have
not generally been accorded that treatment (or usually even been recog-
nized) in cases in the context of either charitable or private trusts.55
51. On the traditional doctrine of cy pres, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 399 &
340 (1959), and on associated resulting trusts, see id. §§ 413, 432.
52. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006) ("the power...
to apply cy pres [is subject to a contrary provision in the terms of the trust that would result in
distribution to a noncharitable beneficiary] only if... fewer than 21 years have elapsed since...
the date of the trust's creation"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003).
53. Compare the discussion of an expressed gift over to another charity, supra text
accompanying note 32, although it should be noted that remainders or executory interests in
nonchaitable situations are subject to rules relating to perpetuities.
54. See "Mullane doctrine," originating in a case involving a trustee's accounting for a
common trust. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950)
(refusing to distinguish between cases in personam and cases in rem or quasi in rem). Included in
its progeny is Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988),
which requires notice to creditors in probate proceedings. A settlor's right to notice is implicitly
recognized in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § lOB (2005), allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction in
the cy pres cases, after the settlor's death, without joinder of the settlor's successors in interest
(although, even with respect to the successors, it should be remembered that state notice
legislation, and the like, has frequently been found-as in Mullane and Tulsa Collection
Services-not to satisfy the mandates of federal due process). For a recent, if rare, case allowing
a settlor's successors standing to assert a reversionary right in a cy pres situation, contending
(unsuccessfully) that the settlor had no general charitable purpose, see Obermeyer v. Bank of
America, 140 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. 2004).
55. This is despite the statement in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b (1959)
that if "the settlor retains an interest in the trust property, he can of course maintain a suit against
the trustee to protect that interest." See, however, general denial of settlor standing in situations
discussed immediately below (often involving decisions in which resulting-trust interests exist),
and compare discussion of settlors of private trusts beginning infra note 108. On standing (or lack
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Do settlors have special-interest standing? Even without retention
of an expressed or implied reversionary interest 56 or the expressed reser-
vation of such powers as one to enforce the trust5 7 or one to direct or
advise the trustee in matters of administration,58 it would seem readily
apparent that a living settlor has an expectation 59 that the designated
trust purpose will be carried out, and has, in normal usage, a "special"
interest in its performance.6 ° It therefore seems counterintuitive that
traditional trust doctrine generally insists that the settlor, as such, lacks
of standing) for counterpart beneficiaries of private trusts, see infra note 82 and accompanying
text.
Similar nonrecognition of a due-process requirement for legally implied reversionary
interests can be seen in legislation specifically concerning parties to cy pres proceedings. See, for
example, recent UNIF. PRUDENT MG Tr. OF INST. FU'DS AcT § 6(c), 7A Pt. III U.L.A. 20 (Supp.
2007), and comments thereto on "Cy Pres" and "Notice to Donors" (although this may assume, a
bit casually, a nontraditional rule of cy pres like that of UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (amended 2005),
7C U.L.A. 509 (2006), with no valid contrary provision in the terms of the trust). Cf MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 214, § 1OB (2005).
56. Considered supra text accompanying notes 50-54, and compare, in the private trust
context, infra text accompanying notes 102-105.
57. See frequent, implicit judicial recognition of standing based on reserved power of
enforcement in, for example, Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995,
997 (Conn. 1997) ("At common law, a donor... had no standing.., to enforce the terms of his or
her gift or trust unless he or she had expressly reserved the right to do so."). Cf Smithers v. St.
Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr, 73 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 2001); infra note 105. ROUNDS, supra
note 19, § 9.4.2, concludes:
Faced with the stark reality that public oversight of charitable trusts is often illusory,
sometimes even subversive of donor intent, more and more prospective settlors are
. . . including express "donor control" provisions in their governing instruments.
For more on such countermeasures, the reader is referred to Section 4.1.1.2 of this
handbook [mentioning, inter alia, powers of enforcement]. While a donor control
provision should take care of the standing problem, it needs to be carefully drawn so
as not to cause ... a tax problem.... [See] Alan F. Rothschild, Jr.'s article entitled
The Do's and Don'ts of Donor Control [30 ACTEC J. 261 (2005)].
58. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-5-12(c) (West 2008) (standing, inter alia, for persons
holding advisory or supervisory powers and others with an interest in the benefits or
administration of charitable trusts). Despite this statute, In re Public Benevolent Trust, 829
N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), held that an animal welfare coalition lacked the interest
required for standing. The standing of holders of powers to direct or advise is further considered
(in the private-trust context) infra notes 102-05.
59. Compare the emphasis on "expectation interests" in Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 921-24, a
concept that is recognized and discussed in ROUNDS, supra note 19, § 4.1.2.
60. "It is hard to argue that grantors do not have a stake in the charitable operations they fund
Ronald Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms in the Charitable Sector: Can
Increased Disclosure of Information Be Utilized Effectively?, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 447, 471
(2006). For arguments that favor settlor standing, see Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 609-10 (1981) (pointing out that the risk of frequent,
unwarranted claims from multiple sources is insignificant in the matter of settlor standing), John
H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 628-29, 646-47,
664 (1995) (analogy to promisee of third-party beneficiary contract), Robert H. Sitkoff, An
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 621, 668-69 (2004) (agency-cost
advantage of settlor enforcement).
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standing to enforce a charitable trust, even to enjoin or seek restitution to
the trust for a trustee's disregard of the settlor's stipulated charitable
purpose or purposes. 6' Intense reactions to highly visible refusals, or
inability, of attorneys general to properly enforce charitable trusts, 62 and
calls for alternative, improved methods of enforcement,63 are producing
some results (although there remain legitimate concerns that need to be
taken into account64). The most significant of these results (if perhaps
less than ideal in its details) is a legislative trend to recognize the special
interest of settlors by statutory grant of standing to enforce charitable
trusts.65 Comparable tendencies are recognizable in case law, although
an observation last year may be overly optimistic in stating: "Recent
judicial decisions, however, have granted donors standing, changing the
landscape of charitable trust jurisprudence and injecting uncertainty into
the state of the law."66
An appropriate direction for common-law evolution (or even for
statutes), absent a contrary trust provision that is more expansive or
more restrictive, should essentially reflect the analogous, carefully quali-
fied recognition of special-interest standing for members of potential-
recipient groups in Hooker v. Edes Home.67 Specifically, a counterpart
rule for settlors would allow them special-interest standing with three
qualifications, beginning with a definitional requirement that, if numer-
ous donors contribute to the funding of the trust, only donors who are
major contributors relative to the total funding would qualify as "set-
tlors." In addition, standing should be "personal" to a settlor, although
exercisable by a deceased settlor's personal representative during a rea-
61. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391, and especially id. cmt. e; IVA
AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 391 (4th ed.
1989).
62. See supra notes 28-29; see also Stephanie Strom, Donors Gone, Charitable Trusts Veer
From Wishes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at Al.
63. E.g., Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate
Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 647 (1999) (suggesting, inter alia, "more flexible
standing rules for persons with 'special interests"' and observing that the "most promising way to
increase the involvement of private citizens in enforcing fiduciary duties appears to be the use of
relators ... [although] only the most dedicated observers of charity are likely to take the step of
suing a charity as a relator"); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil
Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1160 (2005) (making a case for a
personal donor standing). See generally Chester, supra note 60.
64. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
65. Most prominent is UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 486 (2006)
("The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.").
66. Reid Kress Weisbord, Reservations About Donor Standing: Should the Law Allow
Charitable Donors To Reserve the Right To Enforce a Gift Restriction?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 245, 296 (2007) (with legislative proposal answering his question in the affirmative but
within limits that are stringent and detailed). The article reviews various cases, with varying
circumstances, in which settlor standing has been recognized. See id. at 254-59, 265-89.
67. See discussion supra notes 35-45.
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sonable period of estate administration or by an incapacitated settlor's
conservator (or other personal fiduciary, including an agent so author-
ized under a durable power of attorney). The final qualification should,
in the case of a nonprofit organization that receives a restricted gift that
applicable state law treats as a charitable trust,68 so limit special-interest
standing as to enable the settlor to maintain a suit against the trustee-
organization only to enforce compliance with the gift restriction,69
thereby enjoining or redressing an improper7" diversion of trust funds.
These qualifications in a default rule that would grant settlors special-
interest standing probably should serve also as constructional prefer-
ences in interpreting instrument provisions that expressly, but in general
terms, reserve enforcement powers to settlors.
Reasonable rules of settlor standing, with the above qualifications,
can go far toward satisfying the legitimate demand for greater assurance
for settlors, and for the donor public generally, of effective and
informed 71 enforcement of charitable trusts, while reducing burdens on
68. The traditional view of most cases and of the Restatements has long been that, as stated in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003): "An outright devise[ ] or donation to a...
charitable institution, expressly or impliedly to be used for its general purposes, is charitable but
does not create a trust as that term is used in this Restatement. A disposition to such an institution
for a specific purpose, however,... creates a charitable trust of which the institution is the trustee
.... .See also UNIF. SUPERVISION OF TRUSTS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES ACT § 2, 7C U.L.A.
352 (2006) (stating that supervisory authority applies to "any corporation which has accepted
property to be used for a particular charitable corporate purpose as distinguished from the general
purposes of the corporation.").
69. This aspect of the default rule responds to the legitimate concerns that the described
charities may be exposed generally to continuous monitoring, or intrusion into day-to-day
management, by their donors-leaving such matters instead to the institution's concern over
adverse publicity (and thus, for many charities, the salutary influences of the potential-donor
market), as well as to the attorney-general supervision that is applicable to all charitable trustees.
Constructive "diversion" from or abandonment of a trust purpose could be found, however,
in a trustee's significant impairment of the trust estate's value via reckless management or gross
disregard of fiduciary responsibilities in support of its duty to carry out the trust purpose.
70. A diversion would not be "improper" if authorized or directed by a judicial grant of cy
pres.
71. "[T]he circumstances of this case demonstrate the need for co-existent standing for the
Attorney General and the donor.... Indeed, there is no substitute for a donor, who has a special,
personal interest in the enforcement of the gift restriction." Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt
Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 435 (App. Div. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964).
The court in Holt noted:
The Attorney General may not be in a position to become aware of wrongful
conduct or to be sufficiently familiar with the situation to appreciate its impact, and
the various responsibilities of his office may also tend to make it burdensome for
him to institute legal actions .... The present case illustrates these difficulties....
The administration of charitable trusts stands only to benefit if in addition to the
Attorney General other suitable means of enforcement are available. . . . The
cotrustee is also in the best position to learn about breaches of trust and to bring the
relevant facts to a court's attention.
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resources of attorneys general,72 and while also enhancing the likelihood
of attentive, voluntary compliance by trustees. Furthermore, standing
that is "personal" to the settlor (under the second qualification) limits the
risks and burdens of potential litigation by preventing a dispersal of
enforcement rights among potentially numerous successors in interest.
Concern expressed by representatives of some charitable institutions
regarding enforcement rights of potentially unlimited duration (when the
settlor is, for example, a foundation) is unpersuasive given the linited
grounds of challenge under the last of the above qualifications, plus the
availability of cy pres to permit-when justified-departures from des-
ignated charitable purposes.73
II. PRIVATE TRUSTS
A beneficiary of a private trust is entitled to determine the duties of
the trustee74 and to compel the trustee to perform those duties.75
Accordingly, a suit against a trustee for enforcement 76 of the trust may
be maintained by any beneficiary whose rights are jeopardized by the
matter(s) at issue, or by a co-trustee, successor trustee, or other person
acting on behalf of one or more of such beneficiaries.77 Reflecting some
of the concerns associated with standing doctrine generally,78 and
Id. at 935-36 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Strom, supra note 62
("'How are we going to find out?' said Belinda Johns, senior assistant attorney general in the
charitable trusts division of the California attorney general's office. '[W]e have to rely on
someone telling us that there's a problem.'").
72. The concern about burdens and resources was recently illustrated by the Wyoming
Attorney General's decision not to participate in a case of alleged breach of trust, believing that
there were "well-represented private litigants to pursue this litigation." Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d
914, 921 (Wyo. 2007) (noting that now, after the reversal of the lower court's grant of special-
interest standing, "the Attorney General has the opportunity to reassess his position").
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). Compare provision for settlor release
of some restrictions and provision for nonjudicial cy pres for old (suggesting-i.e., in brackets-
twenty years) and small (suggesting $25,000) trusts in UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS
AcT § 6(d)(2), 7A Pt. III U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 2007), and compare also somewhat different
provisions in its predecessor, UNIF. MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS Acr § 7, 7A Pt. III U.L.A. 35 (2006).
74. On the determination of what is allowed within an originally designated purpose, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 71 (2003) (on court instructions to resolve uncertainties about
trustees' duties and powers and about proper interpretation of trust provisions). Cf id. § 66 (on
the possibility of equitable deviation to better achieve an existing purpose).
75. See especially id. §§ 76-79.
76. As comprehensibly defined supra note 8.
77. See, however, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 (2007), recognizing that, as long as
there is a competent holder of a power of revocation or of a presently exercisable general power,
the normal rights and standing that the other beneficiaries would have to protect or enforce their
interests are suspended.
78. Compare three sentences of text preceding note 28, supra, focusing on charitable trusts,
for which the conflicting policy concerns-though analogous-are more weighty than in the
private-trust context.
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emphasizing (perhaps over-emphasizing) the proprietary nature of the
interests of trust beneficiaries, courts and commentators have quite con-
sistently concluded that other persons, including settlors, lack standing
to maintain suits against trustees (including former trustees or their
estates, as appropriate to the context) to enjoin or redress a breach of
trust, or otherwise to enforce a trust.
79
A. Who are the "Beneficiaries" of a Trust?
The 1984 article noted that "[t]he modem trust is a flexible device,
and the grantor may create interests and powers not easily catego-
rized,""° and that any "individual who has a vested or contingent right to
require present or future distribution of trust property to himself or for
his benefit" is a beneficiary,81 including one who holds a reversionary
interest by operation of law. 2 On the other hand, persons who might
"incidentally" benefit from the performance of a trust are not
beneficiaries.83
Illustrative of the flexibility of trust design, and even the effect of
subsequent events, the definition of "beneficiary" includes a person who
is eligible to receive distributions in the discretion of the trustee84 and
one who has succeeded to a beneficial interest by inheritance, assign-
ment, insolvency proceedings, or otherwise. 5 Certainly a settlor hold-
ing a power of revocation86 or the donee of a presently exercisable
general power of appointment, as well as the holder of a power of with-
drawal,87 is a beneficiary. So is the donee of a testamentary general
power of appointment or a special (testamentary or inter vivos) power of
appointment, 88 but one who is merely a permissible appointee is not a
beneficiary unless that person is also an expressed or implied taker in
79. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 (1959).
80. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 908.
81. Id. For an illustrative statute, see CAL. PROB. CODE § 24 (West 2008) ("'Beneficiary' ...
[a]s it relates to a trust, means a person who has any present or future interest, vested or
contingent."). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. a(l), reporter's note
(2007); cf id. § 84 cmt. a. But, for certain of these broadly defined beneficiaries, note the limited
qualifications on standing mentioned supra note 77.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 48 cmt. a. (2003).
83. Id. But cf id. cmt. b.
84. See id. § 50.
85. Id. § 49 cmt. a. A beneficiary's trustee in bankruptcy, for example, is mentioned in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. g (1959) as one who has succeeded to the
beneficiary's interest.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 74(1) (2007).
87. Id. § 74(2).
88. Id. § 48 cmt. a; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(3)(B) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 413
(2006). The brief general language in section 103(3) is consistent with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 48, but it is less detailed and explicit.
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default of appointment.8 9
Increasingly, trust terms designate one or more persons to hold
powers to control or advise a trustee in one or more matters of manage-
ment or distribution. If the designated person holds such a power for his
or her own personal benefit,90 that person is properly viewed as a benefi-
ciary of the trust.9' Accordingly, that person should be recognized as
having standing to enforce the trustee's duties that affect the power
holder's rights or authority 92 but not with regard to other aspects of
administration. Fiduciary powers to direct trustees are considered
subsequently.93
B. Co-Trustees and Successor Trustees
If a trust has multiple trustees, one or more of them can maintain a
suit against one or more others to enforce their duties to the benefi-
ciaries. 94 Similarly, if a trustee who commits a breach of trust is thereaf-
ter removed or otherwise ceases to serve as trustee, a successor trustee
can maintain a suit against the former trustee (or that trustee's estate) to
obtain restitution for the breach. 9 Standing in these cases is implicit in
the duties of trustees ordinarily to act reasonably to prevent or compel
redress of a breach of trust by a co-trustee or to discover and seek resti-
tution for a breach of trust by a predecessor fiduciary. 96
If a trustee who has committed a breach of trust continues to serve
as trustee,97 a court should permit a beneficiary (instead of pursuing the
matter personally) to petition for the appointment of a trustee ad litem or
other special trustee, as locally appropriate, for the purpose of seeking
restitution for the breach.98
C. Others Acting on Behalf of Beneficiaries
Suit against a trustee may be brought on behalf of a beneficiary
who is under incapacity by a conservator, guardian, or similar personal
fiduciary, including an agent so empowered under a durable power of
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 48 cmt. a. (2003).
90. See id. § 75 cmt. c.
91. Id. § 48 cmt. c.
92. See id. § 75 cmts. b, b(1).
93. See infra text accompanying note 104.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. e (1959).
95. Id. cmt. f.
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 (2003) (on co-trusteeship); id. § 76 cmt. d (on
duty regarding predecessor fiduciaries).
97. See supra note 22.
98. On the concept and role of a trustee ad litem, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58
cmt. c(1), reporter's note (2003), and compare supra note 23.
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attorney.99 A creditor holding a lien on a beneficiary's interest is not a
"beneficiary" but should nevertheless have a right, and standing, to
maintain a suit on behalf of the beneficiary for the purpose of protecting
the lien.'°"
1. FIDUCIARY POWERS RESERVED OR GRANTED BY SETTLOR
A settlor may, by the terms of the trust, reserve or confer upon
others a non-beneficial power (that is, ordinarily at least, a fiduciary
power'0 ' ) to control or advise the trustee 10 2 or to amend the trust. 10 3 A
power of this type should enable the holder to sue, on behalf of the
beneficiaries in order to ensure the benefit intended for them, to enforce
the duties of the trustee with regard to that power."° If the terms of the
trust expressly reserve to the settlor or confer upon others a power to
enforce the trust, the power holder has standing to bring suit on behalf of
the beneficiaries against the trustee. 0 5 An express power to enforce the
trust should not be limited in the manner indicated here for other fiduci-
ary powers, nor should any of these powers be viewed as preventing a
beneficiary from acting on his or her own behalf.
The breadth and character of authority sometimes reserved or
granted by a trust provision to one or more persons designated, for
99. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 644 cmt. (2006) ("A person who
may represent a beneficiary's interest under Article 3 [see especially § 303] would have standing
to bring a petition on behalf of the person represented."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TRUSTS § 200 cmt. a (1959); UNIF. STAT. FORM POWER OF ATrORNEY ACT § 11, 8B U.L.A. 214
(2001). A parent, as natural guardian of the person of a minor beneficiary, should have standing
to enforce a trust on behalf of the minor, absent a legally appointed guardian (which should mean,
if properly qualified, having no conflict of interest). See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-403(3), 8 Pt. I
U.L.A. 69-70 (1998); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 303(6) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 470 (2006); cf
Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 920, 931. But cf Richards v. Richards, 637 S.E.2d 672, 674-75 (Ga.
2006) (denying standing to the petitioner under a statutory definition of "interested person"
because she sought to enforce the trust "in her individual capacity" rather than on behalf of her
children).
100. A lien holder, however, is unlike a trustee in bankruptcy, who succeeds to the interest of
the bankrupt beneficiary. See supra note 85.
101. Contrast beneficial powers. See supra notes 90-92.
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmts. c-c(2) (2003).
103. See id. § 64(2) cmt. d.
104. See id. § 75 cmts. b, b(l) & e (together describing a trustee's duties in these situations).
105. It seems clear that such a power is valid and effective, although actual authority is
understandably scarce, see supra note 57, given statements such as that in BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, supra note 3, § 415, at 70 ("Obviously the settlor may expressly reserve to himself
powers and privileges with regard to acts of administration ...."). See also Patton v. Sherwood,
61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289 (Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, the comment to section 808 of the Uniform
Trust Code recognizes the even broader concept of "trust protector," referred to infra note 106;
aside from the twenty jurisdictions that have enacted this Uniform Trust Code section, "statutes of
seven states refer expressly to the position of 'trust protector'." Jonathan C. Lurie & William R.
Burford, Drafting Flexibile Irrevocable Trusts, 33 ACTEC J. 86, 91 (2007).
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example, as "trust protector(s)"' 6 are so diverse and so subject to ques-
tions of interpretation as to preclude ready generalization about the
nature and extent of a power holder's standing to enforce the trust. Nev-
ertheless, the principles and rationale are analogous to those applicable
to powers, as the case may be, to amend, direct or advise, or enforce, as
described in the preceding paragraph or, if beneficial, in Part II.A.1
0 7
2. GENERAL DENIAL OF SETTLOR STANDING
Under generally accepted common-law doctrine, 10 8 neither a settlor
nor the personal representative or successors in interest of a settlor can,
as such, maintain a suit against a trustee to enforce a trust. Despite
arguments that can be advanced for a contrary rule,' 09 this disability in
the private-trust setting has not come under the widespread criticism and
calls for reform that has been so noticeable in the charitable context.
There is, however, a modest but growing statutory trend to recognize a
narrow exception allowing a settlor to petition for removal of a
trustee. 10
This lack of broader concern is probably attributable to the various
alternative bases upon which a settlor may be granted standing, because
the generally stated prohibition does not preclude the settlor's inclusion
in the above discussed situations in which a person has either a benefi-
cial power or interest11I (even by legally implied reversion) or a fiduci-
ary role as trustee or power holder. Nor should the general prohibition
mean that a settlor cannot obtain standing to enforce a trust on behalf of
106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64, cmts. b-d, reporter's notes, at 469-73
(2003); id. § 75, cmts. b-f, reporter's notes, at 64-66 (2007); DONOVAN W.M. WATERS ET AL.,
WATERS' LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 126-30 (3d ed. 2005); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors,
Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761 (2006).
107. See supra notes 88, 90-92. The problems of attempting to ascertain the beneficial or
fiduciary character of the protector's powers are much discussed, especially in "offshore trust"
literature. E.g., Donovan W. M. Waters, The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in TRENDS IN
CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 63, 105-07 (A. J. Oakley ed., 1996); David Hayton, English
Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 555, 579-90 (1999).
108. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b (1959). Contrary decisions,
such as the early Abbott v. Gregory, 39 Mich. 68 (1878), are indeed rare.
109. For example, see concerns regarding premature termination of protective (e.g.,
spendthrift) and other "material purpose" trusts mentioned infra note 110, and compare generally
observations and articles supra note 60.
110. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 575 (2006). Such statutes
may provide a possible response, if not already too late, to concerns about improper trust
terminations allowed by trustees, pursuant to beneficiary consent, in violation of a "material
purpose" of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. b (2003) (on the required
unanimous consent of all beneficiaries); see also id. cmts. d-f (on the material-purpose concept);
cf. Carr v. Carr, 171 N.W. 785 (Iowa 1919).
Ill. Cf Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 920 ("Yet another type of case recognizing economic
interest standing notwithstanding the lack of an express beneficial interest includes those cases in
which the performance of the trust will relieve the grantor of a foreseeable legal obligation.").
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incapacitated, unascertained, or unborn beneficiaries, if not otherwise
adequately represented, by initiating suit either with an accompanying
petition for appointment as guardian ad litem or, if applicable proce-
dures allow, by acting as "next friend."
'' 12
III. TRUSTS WITH BOTH CHARITABLE AND PRIVATE PURPOSES
Many trusts have both charitable and private purposes," t3 usually
designed so that the private and charitable interests are separated either
by substantially independent shares or as successive present and future
interests. Trust arrangements of the latter type are increasingly common
today in some form of "charitable lead trust" (with the charitable interest
followed by private remainder interests) or "charitable remainder trusts"
(with one or more private interests preceding the charitable remain-
der)." 4 The structure, and even the details, of these split-interest trusts
are usually determined by tax objectives of the settlor and associated
requirements of the federal income and transfer taxes."
5
When a trust has both charitable and private interests, those inter-
ests are not only enforceable but also entitled to protection against the
adverse effects of trustee misconduct, 1 6 such as by breach of the fiduci-
ary duty of impartiality in making investment decisions. Despite modest
authority on these matters,' 17 it would seem self-evident that the charita-
ble and private beneficiaries have standing to enforce the trust to the
extent appropriate to the protection of their respective rights.
1' 8
IV. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Since the publication of the 1984 article, there has been substantial
clarification, plus better understanding of the relevant principles, of
standing doctrine applicable to trusts. I believe that, from both John's
point of view and mine (even if not identical), the general direction of
112. As mentioned, for example, in Redstone v. O'Connor, 874 N.E.2d 1118, 1126 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007). Cf Gaubatz, supra note I, at 925 ("best friend").
113. Although such trusts are valid, even if not strictly as "charitable" trusts, RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) cmt. e, they may present tax problems or partially run afoul of
rules regulating perpetuities, conceivably even for some charitable interests. See id. § 29(b) cmts.
g-h(2).
114. The variety of charitable lead and remainder trusts presents diverse "impartiality"
concerns, with even some forms of annuity trusts or unitrusts raising income-productivity issues,
as discussed in id. § 79 cmts. e-g(2) & reporter's notes.
115. See, e.g., Conrad Teitell, Charitable Remainder Trusts-Final Regulations, 24 ACTEC
NOTES 284 (1999).
116. See supra note 114.
117. E.g., Patton v. Sherwood, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 290 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing standing
to enforce "charitable remainder unitrust").
118. Cf supra text accompanying notes 31-33, 74-77, 80-83.
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change in the trust-law rules of standing in this country represents pro-
gress, even if the pace of change is a bit slow and some specific changes
are in need of refinement.
In the charitable-trust context, the concept of standing based on
"special interest" has achieved a level of acceptance (though not univer-
sal) that represents real progress. And it appears that the growing judi-
cial comfort with the concept, together with its evolving limitations, 9 is
leading to less rigidity in its application. Even the common-law reluc-
tance to allow standing to settlors is yielding, gradually and perhaps irre-
sistibly, to legislative change. In this matter, however, the statutes
granting settlor standing may be insufficiently nuanced, especially as
applied to most types of nonprofit institutions. 20 Without continued
progress in both special-interest and settlor standing, public and donor
frustration can be expected to lead, in trust and restricted-gift instru-
ments, to routine inclusion of enforcement provisions 12 1 that may well
be overly broad or inadequately drafted or both.
In the private-trust context, there appears to be an evolving aware-
ness of what the 1984 article referred to as "interests and powers not
easily categorized."' 122 There may be, however, a lesser degree of recog-
nition and clarity with respect to the need to develop appropriate princi-
ples of standing not only for the owners of these diverse beneficial
interests and their personal fiduciaries, 12 3 but also for the holders of a
broad array of beneficial and fiduciary powers. 24 The modesty of the
changes in common-law and statutory rules of settlor standing may be a
reasonable reflection of the modest level of current dissatisfaction with
traditional doctrine. Both the extent and the nature of the changes, how-
ever, are inadequate to deal with (and fail to articulate) the legitimate
concerns, if only occasional problems, involving premature termination
of trusts in disregard of a settlor's "material purpose"125-which should
properly be viewed as restricting the autonomy and "proprietary
rights"'126 of the beneficiaries, so that there would be no intrusion upon
what has been given to them if the settlor were allowed enforcement
only with regard to the material-purpose barrier.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 39-40.
120. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
121. See ROUNDS excerpt, supra note 57.
122. See Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 908.
123. See supra notes 81-89, 99 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93, 101-07.
125. See supra notes 109-10.
126. See supra text following note 78.
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